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Abstract
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic
selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it
demands from its respective customers depending on the amount of traffic they route to it and (2) allocates the
total traffic it receives to its service providers. The profit of a node is the difference between the revenue earned
from servicing others and the cost of using others’ services. We show that the socially optimal routing of such a
game can always be induced by an equilibrium where no node can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its
pricing functions or routing decision. On the other hand, there may also exist inefficient equilibria. We characterize
the loss of efficiency by deriving the price of anarchy at inefficient equilibria. We show that the price of anarchy
is finite for oligopolies with concave marginal cost functions, while it is infinite for general topologies and cost
functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been widely recognized that cooperation in networks formed by autonomous and selfish nodes
cannot be achieved unless sufficient incentives are provided to the nodes. Such incentives normally take
the form of payment or reward to the nodes if they help forward other nodes’ traffic [1]–[5]. A node is
usually willing to participate in routing only if it can charge more than the cost of servicing the transit
traffic. While a selfish node always prices its service with the ultimate aim of maximizing its profit, it has
to do so strategically since the customers it courts may potentially buy services from other nodes. Thus,
there exists a trade-off in each node’s pricing decision. That is, higher charges yield larger profit margins
but risk losing market share to its competitors.
2In this work, we study the game that arises from the selfish and strategic pricing behavior of relay
nodes in a unicast multi-hop relay network consisting of one source and one destination. A node is selfish
in the sense that maximizing its own profit is its sole objective. Being strategic means that a node is able
to optimally design its pricing based on the anticipation of its competitors’ best response to its action.
Specifically, in this game each node is a service provider to a group of nodes (its customers), and when
it needs to forward the traffic received from its customers, the node itself becomes a customer that uses
the services of some other group of nodes. As a service provider, the node announces pricing functions
which specify the payments it demands from its respective customers depending on the amount of traffic
the customers route to the node. As a customer, the node allocates the total traffic it receives to its service
providers in a way that minimizes the sum of its own transmission costs and the payments made to the
service providers. Such a game can exist in both wireline and wireless networks, where communications
consume resources and nodes are often selfish agents. When a network, especially a wireless network,
is formed in an ad hoc manner, a node is typically aware of its neighbors only. A rational node thus
always bases its pricing and routing decisions on the strategies adopted by its neighbors. We will show
that such a game always has equilibria where no node can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its
pricing functions or routing decision. Furthermore, depending on the network topology and the nodes’
response strategy, the global routing configuration at an equilibrium may or may not be socially efficient.
We characterize the loss of efficiency by deriving the price of anarchy at inefficient equilibria. It is found
that the price of anarchy is finite for some link cost functions and topologies, while it is infinite for others.
Pricing schemes were introduced into network resource allocation problems first as a means of de-
composing a global optimization into sub-problems solved by individual agents [6]. In addition to being
a facilitating device, pricing serves as an essential mechanism for inducing social efficiency when users
(source nodes) selfishly choose their routes [7]. It is well known that without appropriate pricing, e.g.
marginal cost pricing, selfish routing inevitably results in loss of efficiency, which in general can be
arbitrarily large [8], [9].
When service providers are also mindful of their self interest, they will use pricing to their own advantage
rather than to heed any social mission. With both users and service providers behaving selfishly, the
network increasingly approximates a free market, where prices can assume a variety of functions and lead
to direct or indirect competition among service providers. For example, pricing network services according
to their quality helps to match each type of service with the customers that value it the most [10], [11]. By
modelling the interaction between the service provider and the users as a Stackelberg game, [12] shows
3that when the service provider always adopts the profit-maximizing price, its revenue per unit bandwidth
and the net utility of each user both improve with the number of users. When multiple service providers
are present in a network, price competition inevitably ensues [13]–[15]. It is demonstrated in [13], [14] that
cooperation in pricing is in the best interest of service providers who jointly serve the same customers. The
dire consequence of non-cooperation is explicitly analyzed in [15], which shows that price competition
in parallel-serial networks can result in arbitrarily large efficiency loss.
In this paper, we analyze the pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where a node can compete for
traffic from multiple nodes and can allocate its received traffic to multiple nodes. Thus, in general, a node
is both a service provider and a customer. Another distinctive feature of the game we consider is that the
bid from each service provider to a targeted customer is a (possibly nonlinear) pricing function, which
specifies the price contingent on the amount of service provided. Previous work on pricing games almost
exclusively assume a constant unit price from every service provider, which in our terms means restricting
pricing functions to be linear. It turns out that the generalization from linear to nonlinear pricing allows
for a much richer set of possibilities in pricing games. Even in economics literature, the issue of nonlinear
pricing is quite new and challenging [16].1 Equilibria derived from such a general framework represent
the most fundamental outcomes of pricing games in multi-hop networks.
We show that the socially optimal routing can always be induced by an equilibrium of the routing/pricing
game where no node can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its pricing functions or routing
decision. On the other hand, there also exist inefficient equilibria. In particular, we show that in an
oligopoly routing/pricing game, inefficient equilibria are always monopolistic, i.e., a dominant relay carries
all the flow from the source. We prove that the price of anarchy at such inefficient equilibria is equal to the
number of relays in an oligopoly if marginal cost functions are concave. In this case, the worst inefficient
equilibria arise with linear marginal cost functions. When marginal cost functions are convex, however, the
price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large. Unlike the case of oligopolies, inefficiency in general multi-hop
relay networks stems not only from dominant relays exercising monopolistic pricing power, but also from
the myopia of dominant relays. We demonstrate that the inability of a node to gauge the impact of its
pricing beyond its local neighborhood can lead to an infinitely large price of anarchy.
1The nonlinear pricing game we study can be seen as a generalized menu auction [17] where each bidder offers a continuum of options
along with their prices.
4II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Traffic and Multi-hop Routing
We consider a relay network represented by a directed graph G = (N , E) with one source s and one
destination w, and a set of relays which can be used to forward traffic in a multi-hop fashion from s to
w. The source s needs to send traffic of a fixed rate Rs to w,2 which can be carried through links in E .
We assume that there is no direct link between s and w. That is, traffic from s has to be routed to w
via relays in a multi-hop fashion. To make matters simple, we assume G contains only nodes and links
which are on the paths from s to w. Since route discovery is not a main concern of this work, we assume
such a G is given a priori, and is loop-free. Each node, however, needs only to be aware of its neighbors
(predecessors, siblings, and offsprings) as specified below.
For node i, h is a predecessor if (h, i) ∈ E . Denote the set of i’s predecessors by Pi. For any h ∈ Pi,
define Shi , {j 6= i : h ∈ Pj}. That is, Shi is the set of nodes which share the common predecessor h with
i. These are the nodes who compete with i for h’s traffic in the pricing game to be introduced later. We
will refer to them as siblings of i with respect to h. Finally, i is said to be an offspring of h if (h, i) ∈ E .
Let the set of h’s offsprings be denoted by Oh. The above notation is illustrated in Figure 1. We make a
h
g
i
j
k Pi = {g, h}
Og = {k, i}
Oh = {i, j}
Sgi = {k}
Shi = {j}
Fig. 1. Illustration of predecessors, siblings and offsprings.
simplifying yet plausible assumption that
⋃
h∈Pi
Shi ∩ Pi = ∅, i.e., no node can be both a sibling and a
predecessor of any other node.
By our assumption on G, s is the only node without any predecessor while w is the only node without
any offspring. Since the pricing game to be studied can arise only if there are multiple relays competing
for the traffic from their common predecessor, we assume in G that every node i except w has multiple
relays in Oi unless Oi = {w}.
Denote the rate of flow on (i, j) ∈ E by fij . A link flow vector f , (fij)(i,j)∈E is a routing of the
session traffic if it satisfies the flow conservation constraint:
∑
h∈Os
fsh = Rs,
∑
k∈Pw
fkw = Rs, and for
2We will discuss the problem involving an elastic session in Section V.
5each relay i, ∑
h∈Pi
fhi =
∑
j∈Oi
fij , ri,
where ri denotes the incoming flow rate at i.
B. Link Cost and Pricing Functions
Each link has a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function Dij(fij), which is private information
to i and j only. For example, Dij(fij) can represent the queuing delay incurred on (i, j) with arrival rate
fij , e.g. the average occupancy function fij/(cij − fij) of an M/M/1 queue with service rate cij . As
another example, if the links are wireless, Dij(fij) can measure the transmission power required for
achieving rate fij . For example, if the link transmission rate fij is determined by transmission power Pij
as fij = W log(1+KPij) for some constants W,K > 0,3 then Pij = 1K
(
2fij/W − 1
)
, Dij(fij), which is
strictly increasing and convex in fij . As suggested by the examples, the analytical framework presented
above applies to both wireline and wireless networks.
For analytical purposes, we further assume that Dij(·) is continuously differentiable with derivative
dij(·). By previous assumptions, dij(·) is positive and strictly increasing. The socially optimal routing is
the routing that minimizes the network cost
∑
(i,j)Dij(fij). Because link costs are strictly convex, the
socially optimal routing is uniquely characterized by the condition that every path from s to w with
positive flow4 has the minimum marginal cost among all paths. For otherwise, one can reduce the total
cost by shifting an infinitesimal amount of flow from a path with non-minimum marginal cost to a
minimum-marginal-cost path.
We model the source and relays as selfish agents who must pay for the costs on their outgoing links.
While the source has to send all its traffic out, it strives to do this with the minimum cost. On the other
hand, a relay has an incentive to forward traffic for its predecessors only if it is adequately rewarded for
its service in the form of payment by its predecessors. The amount of payment is determined as follows.
Suppose a node h has incoming flow of rate rh > 0. Each i ∈ Oh announces a pricing function P hi (·)
which specifies the payment P hi (fhi) it demands should h forward traffic of rate fhi to it.5 For analytical
purposes, we assume that P hi (t) is continuously differentiable with derivative phi (t). Note that P hi (·)
3Assume that with proper time or frequency scheduling, transmission on different links are non-interfering.
4The flow rate of a path is the minimum of the flow rates of all the links on that path.
5The domain of P hi (·) must contain the interval [0, rh]. And as we will see, a selfish and strategic relay i always designs P hi (·) tailored
to the total traffic rh. However, for simplicity we do not express such dependence in the notation.
6provides h a continuum of options, namely the rate-price pairs (fhi, P hi (fhi)).6 After learning (P hi (·))i∈Oh ,
h decides on the allocation of rh and makes payments to its offsprings accordingly.
C. Pricing Game
We assume every node is selfish and strategic.7 The source s thus always allocates the total flow Rs to
the nodes in Os so as to minimize its total cost, which includes the costs on its outgoing links and the
payments to its offsprings. Specifically, given the pricing functions P si (·) of i ∈ Os, the optimal allocation
of Rs from the perspective of s is any
(f ∗si)i∈Os ∈ argmin
(fsi)∈Fs(Rs)
∑
i∈Os
Dsi(fsi) + P
s
i (fsi), (1)
where Fi(r) is defined as {(fik)k∈Oi ≥ 0 :
∑
k fik = r}.
A relay i is a predecessor to some nodes, and is an offspring to some other nodes. As a predecessor,
it acts just like s. That is, it allocates the total incoming flow in the most cost efficient way from its own
perspective. Thus, the traffic allocation adopted by i when it has incoming flow ri is any
(f ∗ik)k∈Oi ∈ argmin
(fik)∈Fi(ri)
∑
k∈Oi
Dik(fik) + P
i
k(fik). (2)
Denote the minimum value in (2) by Di(ri). Note that Di(ri) represents the minimum cost to i for
forwarding flow of rate ri.8 It is easy to show that Di(·) is continuous and increasing with piecewise
continuous derivative denoted by di(·).
As an offspring, i designs P hi (·) for every h ∈ Pi with the aim of maximizing its profit in competition
with its siblings (discussed in depth later). It does this with the assumption that h always allocates in the
most cost efficient way, and that rh for each h ∈ Pi stays constant at the current value irrespective of its
choice of P hi (·). While the first assumption is very reasonable, the second one requires some justification.
Theoretically, since rh of h ∈ Pi is the outcome of the optimal allocation by h’s predecessors, it in
general cannot stay constant if h changes its pricing functions. However, h’s pricing functions presumably
are tied to i’s choice of P hi (·) as the total cost to h is partly leveraged by the price charged by i. Once
6If i has multiple predecessors, P hi (t) for one h ∈ Pi is an agreement exclusively between i and h, independent of the flow rates allocated
to i by other predecessors. Presumably, however, i designs P hi (t) for all h ∈ Pi jointly because ri =
P
h∈Pi
fhi, and i has to pay its
offsprings to get ri forwarded.
7The destination w is the only node that plays no active role in the pricing game described below. It passively accepts the flow assigned
by its predecessors, who treat it as an offspring using a uniformly-zero pricing function. Because G is assumed to be loop-free and provide
directed path(s) to w from every other node, the total flow arriving at w must be equal to Rs.
8Although not explicit from the notation, Di(·) depends on (P ik(·))k∈Oi .
7h reacts to the change in P hi (·) by updating its own pricing functions, rh is inevitably adjusted by h’s
predecessors. On the other hand, relays are usually too myopic to note this chain reaction since they have
very limited knowledge of the network. Recall that we made a practical assumption that a relay is aware
of only its predecessors, siblings and offsprings. As a result, it can at best predict the impact of its strategy
on the traffic allocation by its predecessors, but not nodes further upstream. It is therefore reasonable for i
to consider only the competition with its siblings for the flow their common predecessors currently have.
We now formally define the (static) pricing game (PG) as having the following components:
• The set of players I = N\{s, w}: relays in G.
• Strategy of player i: continuously differentiable pricing functions P hi (·) for all h ∈ Pi.
• Payoff to player i: the profit made by servicing (f ∗hi)h∈Pi:∑
h∈Pi
P hi (f
∗
hi)−Di
(∑
h∈Pi
f ∗hi
)
, (3)
where the routing (f ∗ij)(i,j)∈E is most cost efficient from the perspective of every node, i.e., (1)-(2)
hold for s and every relay i where ri =
∑
h∈Pi
f ∗hi.
A pricing game is fully characterized by the tuple (G, (Dij(·)), Rs). In the rest of the paper, we will study
the outcome of the PG with myopic players as described above. The focus of our work is to investigate
whether the PG has an equilibrium where no relay can increase its profit by unilaterally changing its
pricing functions, and when an equilibrium exists, how the resulting routing compares to the socially
optimal one.
D. Best Response and Equilibrium
Each player i in the PG is assumed to be myopic in the sense that it knows the pricing func-
tions of all its competitors as well as its downstream nodes. Based on its local information Li ,
((rh, (P
h
j (·))j∈Shi )h∈Pi , (P
i
k(·))k∈Oi), player i anticipates a payoff Γi(P i;Li) when adopting P i , (P hi (·))h∈Pi ,
where
Γi(P i;Li) ,
∑
h∈Pi
P hi (f
∗
hi)−
∑
k∈Oi
[
Dik(f
∗
ik) + P
i
k(f
∗
ik)
]
,
(f ∗hj)j∈Oh is the optimal allocation of rh by h ∈ Pi given (P hj (·))j∈Oh, and (f ∗ik)k∈Oi is the optimal
allocation of r∗i =
∑
h∈Pi
f ∗hi given (P ik(·))k∈Oi.
Definition 1: A pricing function profile (P hi (·))h∈Pi is a best response to local information Li if
Γi(P i;Li) = max
Qifeasible
Γi(Qi;Li),
8where Qi = (Qhi (·))h∈Pi is feasible if every component is a continuously differentiable function.
Denote the set of best responses to Li by Bi(Li). Before we proceed, we must prove that Bi(Li) is
non-empty.
Lemma 1: For any Li, the set Bi(Li) is non-empty. Furthermore, P i ∈ Bi(Li) if and only if for all
h ∈ Pi and all t ∈ [0, rh],
Bhi (t) , Dhi(t) + P
h
i (t) ≥ B
h
iˆ
(rh)− B
h
iˆ
(rh − t), (4)
and
Bhi (f˜hi) = B
h
iˆ
(rh)− B
h
iˆ
(rh − f˜hi), (5)
where
Bh
iˆ
(r) , min
(fhj)∈Fh(r)
fhi=0
∑
j∈Shi
Bhj (fhj) (6)
and (f˜hi)h∈Pi is a vector that maximizes
Γ¯i(f i;Li) ,
∑
h∈Pi
[
Bh
iˆ
(rh)− B
h
iˆ
(rh − fhi)−Dhi(fhi)
]
−Di
(∑
h∈Pi
fhi
)
over all the f i = (fhi) such that 0 ≤ fhi ≤ rh for all h ∈ Pi.
Before giving the proof, we first provide some intuitive explanations for the lemma. The function Bhi (t)
gives the total cost h spends on routing traffic of rate t to i. Since Dhi(·) is fixed and known to i, it is
equivalent to treat Bhi (·) as the pricing function i uses to charge h. With this view, h makes a lump-sum
payment to i determined by Bhi (·), and lets i pay for the cost Dhi(·) on link (h, i). For convenience, from
now on we assume each relay i announces Bhi (·) to h ∈ Pi and siblings j ∈ Shi . By (6), Bhiˆ (r) represents
the minimum cost h can achieve by forwarding traffic of rate r to offsprings other than i. It will become
evident in the next proof that from i’s viewpoint, the competition from all j ∈ Shi can be aggregated into
a virtual competitor iˆh using pricing function Bh
iˆ
(·). Thus, it is as if i were competing with one relay iˆh in
each “market” h ∈ Pi. The vector (f˜hi)h∈Pi represents the “market shares” that jointly yield the maximum
(anticipated) profit to i. Pricing functions Bhi (·) which satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 induce h ∈ Pi
to allocate the ideal “market share” f˜hi to i and give i the maximum profit. This is because (5) implies
that allocating f˜hi to i and the rest to other relays yields the same cost to h as allocating all the traffic to
other relays. So conditions (4) and (5) combined imply that no other allocation costs less than the above
two schemes.
9Proof of Lemma 1: First notice that for fixed Li, the profit of i when it adopts (Bhi (·))h∈Pi is upper
bounded as follows:
Γi((B
h
i (·));Li) =
∑
h∈Pi
[
Bhi (fhi)−Dhi(fhi)
]
−Di
(∑
h∈Pi
fhi
)
≤
∑
h∈Pi
[
Bh
iˆ
(rh)−B
h
iˆ
(rh − fhi)−Dhi(fhi)
]
−Di
(∑
h∈Pi
fhi
)
= Γ¯i(f i;Li) ≤ Γ¯i(f˜i;Li),
where f i , (fhi)h∈Pi is the optimal amount of traffic allocated to i when i uses (Bhi (·)). The first
inequality holds because for every h ∈ Pi, Bhi (fhi) ≤ Bhiˆ (rh) − B
h
iˆ
(rh − fhi). For otherwise, h would
find the cost of allocating rh exclusively to all j ∈ Shi (Bhiˆ (rh)) strictly less than the cost of allocating
fhi to i and rh − fhi to j ∈ Shi (Bhi (fhi) +Bhiˆ (rh − fhi)), a contradiction. The second inequality follows
from the definition of f˜ i.
Notice that the upper bound Γ¯i(f˜i;Li) is independent of (Bhi (·)). It is tight if and only if both inequalities
hold with equality. To make the second inequality tight, it is necessary and sufficient to have the traffic
allocation f i induced by (Bhi (·)) equal to f˜i. Given that, the first inequality is tight if (4)-(5) hold, since
they guarantee that allocating f˜hi to i and rh− f˜hi to j ∈ Shi is in h’s best interest. They are also necessary
because (5) is prerequisite for the first inequality to be tight, and consequently (4) cannot be violated either.
For example, if for some h ∈ Pi and some t ∈ [0, rh], Bhi (t) < Bhiˆ (rh) − B
h
iˆ
(rh − t). Then allocating t
to i and rh − t to j ∈ Shi would incur strictly less cost to h than Bhiˆ (rh) = B
h
i (t)(f˜hi) + B
h
iˆ
(rh − f˜hi).
Thus, h would not have allocated f˜hi to i, which is a contradiction. 
Note that best response (Bhi (·)) always exists because, for instance, Bhi (t) = Bhiˆ (rh)− B
h
iˆ
(rh − t) for
t ∈ [0, rh] satisfies (4)-(5). The (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria are defined as the fixed points of the best
response mapping.
Definition 2: Pricing function profiles P i, i ∈ I constitute an equilibrium if for all i ∈ I, P i ∈ Bi(Li)
where the incoming flow vector (rh)h∈Pi contained in Li results from the routing (f ∗ij)(i,j)∈E that is most
cost efficient from the perspective of every individual node, i.e., (1)-(2) hold for s and all i ∈ I,
rh =
∑
g∈Ph
f ∗gh, if h 6= s
and rh = Rs if h = s.
10
It is easy to see that if (P i)i∈I constitutes an equilibrium, Γi(P i;Li) must coincide with the actual
payoff of i.
Definition 3: An equilibrium (P i)i∈I is efficient if it induces the socially optimal routing. In this case,
(P i)i∈I is said to induce the social optimum.
Before proving the existence of equilibria and analyzing their efficiency in the general setting, we first
study pricing games under some simple network topologies. The analysis of these games not only provide
valuable insight into the general problem but also have significant implications in their own right.
III. EQUILIBRIA IN OLIGOPOLY
The simplest topologies within our framework are those including a single layer of relays, e.g. the one
in Figure 2. Here, N relays each have a direct link from s and a direct link to w. They compete for the
s w
1
2
N
1
( )sd 
2
( )
s
d 
( )sNd 
1
( )d 
2
( )d 
( )
N
d 
s
R
Fig. 2. Oligopoly with N relays.
total flow Rs by advertising their pricing functions βi(·) = dsi(·) + pi(·), i = 1, · · · , N . From now on,
we will more often refer to the derivatives dij(·) and pi(·) as link cost and pricing functions, since they
appear to be more convenient for marginal cost analysis at equilibria. Also we will use simplified notation
whenever appropriate, e.g. the superscript is omitted from pi(·), βi(·) as s is the only predecessor to every
relay. We refer to a pricing game under such a topology as an oligopoly. Define λi(t) , dsi(t) + di(t).
An oligopoly PG is fully characterized by the tuple (N, (λi(·))Ni=1, Rs).
Because all λi(·) are strictly increasing, the socially optimal routing (r∗i )Ni=1 is unique and is given by
λi(r
∗
i ) = min
j=1,··· ,N
λj(r
∗
j )
if r∗i > 0.
11
We now analyze the routing established by the oligopoly PG. Given (βi(·))i∈Os , the self-interest of s
leads it to adopt the most cost efficient routing (f ∗si)Ni=1 such that
βi(f
∗
si) = min
j=1,··· ,N
βj(f
∗
sj) (7)
whenever f ∗si > 0. Whether (f ∗si) = (r∗i ) or not depends on how (βi(·)) are chosen by the individual
relays.
A. Best Response and Existence of Equilibria
We apply Lemma 1 to the oligopoly PG. Here,
Bi(t) =
∫ t
0
βi(r) dr,
Biˆ(t) = minP
j 6=i fsj=t
∑
j 6=i
∫ fsj
0
βj(r) dr.
It is easy to show that Biˆ(t) is continuous and increasing. Its derivative, denoted by βiˆ(t), is in general
piecewise continuous. For t ∈ (0, Rs), let the left and right limits of βiˆ(t) be denoted by βiˆ(t)− and
βiˆ(t)
+
.
9 By Lemma 1, the best response of i given βiˆ(·) can be simply characterized by∫ t
0
βi(r) dr

 ≥
∫ t
0
βiˆ(Rs − r) dr, 0 ≤ t ≤ Rs
=
∫ t
0
βiˆ(Rs − r) dr, t = f
∗
i ,
(8)
where
f ∗i ∈ argmax
0≤fi≤Rs
∫ fi
0
βiˆ(Rs − r)− λi(r) dr. (9)
To gain an intuitive idea of the above conditions, suppose βiˆ(Rs − r) and λi(r) are given by the dashed
and solid curves in Figure 3. A typical best response βi(r) is shown as the dotted curve. In particular,
*
i
f sR r0
( )
i
rO
ˆ ( )si R rE 
( )
i
rE
Fig. 3. Typical best response curve in oligopoly.
one can let βi(r) coincide with βiˆ(Rs − r) on [0, f ∗i ] and let βi(r) ≥ βiˆ(Rs − r) on (f ∗i , Rs]. Such a
best response will be referred to as a replicating response. As we will show, oligopoly equilibria induced
by replicating responses are always efficient while equilibria induced by other best responses are not
necessarily efficient.
9It is understood that βiˆ(0) has only a right limit and that βiˆ(Rs) has only a left limit.
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B. Efficient Equilibria
Theorem 1: The socially optimal routing of an oligopoly can always be induced by an equilibrium.
Proof: We prove the theorem by constructing an equilibrium that induces the socially optimal routing
(r∗i ). Define λ∗ , minj=1,··· ,N λj(r∗j ). Let βi(r) ≡ λ∗ for all i. Then βi(r) = βiˆ(Rs − r) = λ∗ is a best
response for all i with f ∗i = r∗i . Thus, (βi(·)) constitutes an equilibrium which results in the routing (r∗i ). 
Because the socially optimal routing always exists, we can conclude that there always exists an efficient
equilibrium for any oligopoly pricing game.
Although we used constant (βi(·)) (or linear pricing functions (Bi(·))) to construct an efficient equi-
librium in the proof, efficient equilibria can be established by nonlinear pricing functions as well. For
instance, Figure 4 depicts an equilibrium in a duopoly PG where the two relays adopt β1(·), β2(·) of a
more general shape. Notice that in a duopoly, β1ˆ(t) = β2(t) and β2ˆ(t) = β1(t).
*
1
r sR r0
1
( )rO
2
( )
s
R rO 
1 2
( ) ( )
s
r R rE E 
Fig. 4. General (focal) equilibrium in duopoly.
To derive a simple criterion for checking the efficiency of an equilibrium, we need to make the following
distinction. A routing (fi)Ni=1 is said to be monopolistic if fm = Rs for some relay m and fj = 0 for
all j 6= m. In this case, m is called the dominant relay. An equilibrium is monopolistic if it induces a
monopolistic routing. A routing is said to be competitive if there are at least two relays i, j such that
fi > 0, fj > 0. An equilibrium is competitive if it induces a competitive routing.
Theorem 2: If an oligopoly equilibrium is competitive, it must be efficient.
We will need the next lemma to prove Theorem 2.
Lemma 2: At an oligopoly equilibrium (βi(·)) which induces routing (f ∗i ), if 0 < f ∗i ≤ Rs, then for
all j 6= i,
βiˆ(Rs − f
∗
i )
+ ≤ βj(f
∗
j ).
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If 0 ≤ f ∗i < Rs, then for all j 6= i such that f ∗j > 0,
βiˆ(Rs − f
∗
i )
− ≥ βj(f
∗
j ).
Proof: By definition, if t < Rs, βiˆ(t)+ = lim∆→0+(Biˆ(t+∆)−Biˆ(t))/∆. Therefore when f ∗i > 0,
βiˆ(Rs − f
∗
i )
+ = lim
∆→0+
1
∆
{Biˆ(Rs − f
∗
i +∆)−Biˆ(Rs − f
∗
i )}
(a)
= lim
∆→0+
1
∆
{
minP
j 6=i fj=Rs−f
∗
i +∆
∑
j 6=i
∫ fj
0
βj(r) dr −
∑
j 6=i
∫ f∗j
0
βj(r) dr
}
(b)
≤ lim
∆→0+
1
∆
{∫ f∗
k
+∆
0
βk(r) dr +
∑
j 6=i,k
∫ f∗j
0
βj(r) dr −
∑
j 6=i
∫ f∗j
0
βj(r) dr
}
= lim
∆→0+
1
∆
∫ f∗
k
+∆
f∗
k
βk(r) dr = βk(f
∗
k ).
Here, equation (a) follows from the fact that (f ∗j )Nj=1 is the equilibrium routing of Rs induced by (βj(·))Nj=1.
Inequality (b) is obtained by substituting the minimum-cost routing of Rs−f ∗i +∆ by an arbitrary routing,
namely f ∗k +∆ allocated to k and f ∗j to each j 6= i, k. The second inequality in the lemma can be proved
in a similar manner. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Let (f ∗i ) be the routing induced by a competitive equilibrium (βi(·)). Let m,n
be any two relays such that f ∗m > 0, f ∗n > 0. It is enough to show that λm(f ∗m) = λn(f ∗n) and that
λm(f
∗
m) ≤ λj(f
∗
j ) for any j with f ∗j = 0. By (7), βm(f ∗m) = βn(f ∗n). The best response condition (9)
implies that βmˆ(Rs − f ∗m)− ≤ λm(f ∗m) ≤ βmˆ(Rs − f ∗m)+. By Lemma 2, βn(f ∗n) ≤ βmˆ(Rs − f ∗m)−
and βmˆ(Rs − f ∗m)+ ≤ βn(f ∗n). In conclusion, βn(f ∗n) = λm(f ∗m). By symmetry, we can show that
βm(f
∗
m) = λn(f
∗
n). Therefore, λm(f ∗m) = λn(f ∗n). Now suppose f ∗j = 0. By (9) and Lemma 2, λj(0) ≥
βjˆ(Rs)
− ≥ βn(f ∗n) = λm(f
∗
m). So the proof is complete. 
C. Inefficient Equilibria
Theorem 2 does not rule out the possibility of inefficient equilibria. In fact, an equilibrium may be
inefficient if it is monopolistic. For example, the socially optimal routing of the duopoly PG represented
by Figure 5 is (r∗1, Rs − r∗1) whereas the equilibrium depicted leads to a monopolistic routing (Rs, 0).
In this example, relay 2 adopts a pricing function β2(·) such that
∫ Rs
0
β2(r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
λ2(r) dr and
β2(Rs − r) > λ1(r) for all r ∈ [0, Rs]. Given such a β2(·), relay 1 would want to acquire all the flow
(cf. (9)) by using β1(·) such that
∫ t
0
β1(Rs − r) dr <
∫ t
0
λ2(r) dr and
∫ t
0
β1(r) dr >
∫ t
0
β2(Rs − r) dr for
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all t ∈ (0, Rs) and
∫ Rs
0
β1(Rs − r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
λ2(r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
β2(r) dr. Thus, it satisfies (8) and leaves
relay 2 no incentive to acquire any traffic. So the monopolistic equilibrium holds.
In general, monopolistic equilibria in an oligopoly PG have the following property.
Theorem 3: If an oligopoly equilibrium is monopolistic with dominant relay m, we must have∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr ≤
∫ Rs
0
λj(r) dr
for any other relay j.
Proof: Consider any j with f ∗j = 0 in a monopolistic equilibrium. The condition (9) implies that∫ Rs
0
λj(r) dr ≥
∫ Rs
0
βjˆ(Rs − r) dr.
On the other hand, ∫ Rs
0
βjˆ(Rs − r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
βjˆ(r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
βm(r) dr,
since from the perspective of s, the optimal allocation of Rs to all the relays except j still assigns all the
traffic to m. It follows from m’s best response conditions (8)-(9) that∫ Rs
0
βm(r) dr =
∫ Rs
0
βmˆ(Rs − r) dr ≥
∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr.
Thus the proof is complete. 
The next conclusion easily follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1: If the socially optimal routing of an oligopoly is monopolistic, then every equilibrium of
the oligopoly is monopolistic and efficient.
Proof: It can deduced from the uniqueness of the socially optimal routing and Theorem 2 that every
equilibrium of such an oligopoly must be monopolistic. By Theorem 3, the dominant relay m of such an
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equilibrium has the minimum
∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr among all relays. But such an m must be the dominant relay
in the socially optimal routing. 
It is shown next that there always exists a monopolistic equilibrium in an oligopoly. Thus, we have the
following conclusion.
Corollary 2: If the socially optimal routing of an oligopoly is competitive, then there exists an inefficient
(monopolistic) equilibrium.
Proof: We need only show that there exists a monopolistic equilibrium in such an oligopoly. Let all
βj(·) be the same strictly decreasing function β(·) such that
∫ t
0
β(Rs − r)dr ≤
∫ t
0
λj(r)dr for all j and
t ∈ [0, Rs) but
∫ Rs
0
β(Rs − r)dr =
∫ Rs
0
λm(r)dr where m ∈ argminj
∫ Rs
0
λj(r)dr. Since β(·) is strictly
decreasing, βjˆ(r) = β(r) for all j. By construction, f ∗j = 0 is an ideal flow to j 6= m (cf. (9)) whereas
βm(·) = β(·) and f ∗m = Rs jointly satisfy m’s best response conditions (8)-(9). So the monopolistic
equilibrium is established. 
When an oligopoly has inefficient equilibria, it is of interest to compare the worst-case network cost
under an inefficient equilibrium to the optimal cost.
D. Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy, as a measure of loss of social efficiency due to selfish behavior of individual
agents, was studied in the literature on selfish routing [8], [9]. In this work, the price of anarchy of a
general PG is defined as follows.
Definition 4: The price of anarchy ρ(G, (Dij(·)), Rs) of a pricing game (G, (Dij(·)), Rs) is the ratio of
the maximum cost at an equilibrium to the socially optimal cost, i.e.,
ρ(G, (Dij(·)), Rs) ,
max(fij)∈FE
∑
(i,j)∈E Dij(fij)∑
(i,j)∈E Dij(f
∗
ij)
,
where FE is the collection of all routings that can be induced by an equilibrium of (G, (Dij(·)), Rs) and
(f ∗ij)(i,j)∈E is the socially optimal routing of the game.
In this section, we study the price of anarchy specifically for oligopolies. As we will show, ρ(N, (λi(·)), Rs)
is equal to N when marginal cost functions are concave, e.g. when cost functions are quadratic. However,
the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large when when marginal cost functions are convex, as is the case
for the cost functions discussed in Section II-B.
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Theorem 4: If the cost derivatives (λi(·)) are concave, ρ(N, (λi(·)), Rs) of an oligopoly pricing game
is upper bounded by the number of relays N . The upper bound is achieved when the cost derivatives are
linear.
Proof: Let the socially optimal routing be (r∗i )Ni=1 = (αiRs)Ni=1 where the coefficients (αi) are nonneg-
ative and sum to one. The optimal cost then is
D∗ =
N∑
i=1
∫ αiRs
0
λi(r) dr.
Since λi(r) is concave, it can be shown that
∫ αiRs
0
λi(r)dr ≥ α2i
∫ Rs
0
λi(r)dr where equality holds when
λi(r) is linear. Therefore, D∗ is lower bounded as
D∗ ≥
N∑
i=1
α2i
∫ Rs
0
λi(r) dr.
Recall that inefficient equilibria in an oligopoly are monopolistic such that the dominant relay m satisfies
Theorem 3. The price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the cost at any monopolistic equilibrium (ME) to
D∗, is upper bounded as
DME
D∗
(a)
≤
∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr∑N
i=1 α
2
i
∫ Rs
0
λi(r) dr
(b)
≤
∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr∑N
i=1 α
2
i
∫ Rs
0
λm(r) dr
=
1∑N
i=1 α
2
i
(c)
≤ N.
Next we specify the condition under which the upper bound is achieved. Notice that (a) holds with
equality if and only if
∫ αiRs
0
λi(r)dr = α
2
i
∫ Rs
0
λi(r)dr for all i. This requires each λi(r) to be a linear
function. Inequality (b) is tight when ∫ Rs
0
λi(r)dr =
∫ Rs
0
λm(r)dr for every i 6= m. Hence, all the relays
must have the same linear λi(r). Thus, (r∗i ) must be the uniform, hence competitive, allocation, i.e.,
αi = 1/N for all i. This is exactly what is needed to make (c) tight.
Now it remains to find the pricing functions which can induce the monopolistic equilibrium attaining
the upper bound. Let βi(r) = λ(Rs − r) , β(r) for every i.10 Since βi(r) is strictly decreasing for every
i, βiˆ(r) = β(r) = λ(Rs− r). Since βiˆ(Rs− r) = λ(r), every relay is indifferent to having any amount of
flow. Thus, the monopolistic equilibrium can be sustained. 
Unlike the selfish routing games considered in [8], [9], for which the price of anarchy is independent
of the topology [18], Theorem 4 indicates that ρ(N, (λi(·)), Rs) of an oligopoly PG explicitly depends
on topology through N . Such a conclusion implies that the more intensive (larger N) the competition is,
10Here we have omitted the subscript of λi(·) in light of the symmetry.
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the more inefficient the market becomes if it is monopolized. The situation is even worse if the relays in
an oligopoly have convex λi(·). In this case, the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large.
Theorem 5: For a fixed number N ≥ 2 of relays and for any M > 0, there exists an oligopoly
(N, (λi(·))Ni=1, Rs) with convex (λi(·)) such that ρ(N, (λi(·)), Rs) ≥M .
Sketch of Proof: We can construct an oligopoly with N relays such that the socially optimal routing is
competitive. By Corollary 2, inefficient monopolistic equilibria exist. However, within the class of convex
functions, λm(·) of the dominant relay m can be designed so that
∫ Rs
0
λm(·) ≥ MD∗, where D∗ is the
optimal cost. 
E. Focal Equilibria
Although possible, inefficient equilibria in an oligopoly are very unlikely to happen. The example in
Figure 5 represents a highly pathological situation. Such an equilibrium is reached only if the subtle
relationships between β2(·) and λ1(·) and between β1(·) and λ2(·) are satisfied. These relationships,
however, can be established only by coincidence, since relay 2 cannot observe λ1(·) and relay 1 cannot
observe λ2(·). In a general PG, it is arguably most rational for a relay to use a replicating response as
described in Section III-A.
Definition 5: A focal equilibrium of a general pricing game is an equilibrium where every relay i
adopts the replicating response to its local information Li = ((rh, (Bhj (·))j∈Shi )h∈Pi, (B
i
k(·))k∈Oi), i.e., for
all h ∈ Pi,
Bhi (t)

 = B
h
iˆ
(rh)− Bhiˆ (rh − t), t ∈ [0, f
∗
hi]
≥ Bh
iˆ
(rh)−Bhiˆ (rh − t), t ∈ (f
∗
hi, rh]
, (10)
where (Bh
iˆ
(·), f ∗hi)h∈Pi are as specified in Lemma 1.11
In this section, we investigate focal equilibria in oligopolies. Such equilibria are not only reasonable for
implementation, but also, more importantly, always efficient. The next theorem establishes the existence
of focal equilibria in an oligopoly.
Theorem 6: The socially optimal routing of an oligopoly is always induced by a focal equilibrium.
11Since the derivative βh
iˆ
(·) of Bh
iˆ
(·) is in general piecewise continuous, we henceforth allow the derivative βhi (·) of Bhi (·) to be piecewise
continuous. Let βhi (r)− and βhi (r)+ denote the left and right limits of βhi (·) at r.
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Proof: Note that the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is a focal equilibrium. 
Figure 4 illustrates a focal equilibrium in a duopoly induced by nonlinear pricing functions B1(·), B2(·).
The linear pricing equilibrium used in the proof is a special case of Figure 4 such that the curves of β1(r)
and β2(r) are the same horizontal line that passes the point where λ1(r) and λ2(Rs− r) intersect. Notice
that the focal equilibria encompassed by the above example have a common property. That is, the curves
βi(·) and λi(·) of all i intersect at the point that corresponds to the social optimum. The next theorem
states that such a phenomenon is no coincidence.
Theorem 7: Every focal equilibrium of an oligopoly is efficient.
Proof: In light of Theorem 2, we only need to show that any monopolistic focal equilibrium is efficient.
Let (βi(·)) be the pricing functions that induce such an equilibrium where m is the dominant relay. By
the best response condition (9) and the fact that βm(·) is a replicating response to βmˆ(·), at f ∗m = Rs,
λm(Rs) ≤ βmˆ(0)
+ = βm(Rs)
−.
Applying (9) and Lemma 2 to any j 6= m, we have
λj(0) ≥ βjˆ(Rs)
− ≥ βm(Rs)
−.
Therefore, λm(Rs) ≤ λj(0) for any j 6= m, which implies that the monopolistic routing is efficient. 
To summarize, as the most reasonable outcomes of a pricing game, focal equilibria always exist and
are always efficient in oligopolies. We have yet to find out whether these properties hold in general PGs.
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the class of focal equilibria when we study pricing games in
multi-hop networks.12 For brevity, we will drop the qualifier “focal” henceforth.
IV. EQUILIBRIA IN GENERAL PRICING GAME
In this section, we consider a general multi-hop relay network with one source-destination pair as
described in Section II. As in Section III, we assume that in every local competition, a relay i declares
βhi (·) = p
h
i (·) + dhi(·) to an h ∈ Pi and all j ∈ Shi .
Notice that if h ∈ Pi has rh = 0, then technically any βhi (·) is a best response since the local competition
involving i and j ∈ Shi is vacuous. To prevent absurd equilibria resulting from such arbitrary pricing,
12We deliberately ignore the type of inefficient equilibria discussed in Section III-C because there is no new discovery we can make about
them in the general PG. They are inefficient in oligopolies, and therefore inefficient in general PGs.
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however, we assume that i uses honest pricing βhi (t) = dhi(t) + di(t+
∑
h′∈Pi\h
f ∗h′i) when rh = 0. Here,
f ∗h′i is the flow i intends to acquire from h′ ∈ Pi\h,13 di(t+
∑
h′∈Pi\h
f ∗h′i) is the derivative of the minimum
cost incurred by i in forwarding traffic to its offsprings. Thus, βhi (t) exactly matches the actual cost of
i for forwarding flow from h. Honest pricing, though restrictive, is in line with i’s self interest. Being
honest with its own cost, i maximally alleviates the burden of h, whose cost is partly leveraged by βhi (·).
Therefore, honest pricing can be seen as the best effort by i to help improve the competitiveness of h, in
the hope of earning profit from h should h later receive positive rh from its predecessors.
We will frequently use the following terms. A path is a concatenation of links from s to w, while a
sub-path is a contiguous segment of a path from a relay to w. Given a routing (fij)(i,j)∈E , a path/sub-path
is said to have positive flow if fmn > 0 for every (m,n) in that path/sub-path. Otherwise, the path/sub-path
is said to have zero flow. The marginal cost on a path/sub-path is the sum of dmn(fmn) over all (m,n)
on that path/sub-path.
Theorem 8: The socially optimal routing of a general PG can be induced by an equilibrium.
Due to its length, the proof of the theorem is deferred to Appendix A.
A. Inefficient Equilibria and Price of Anarchy
Unlike the oligopoly case, in a general PG, not all focal equilibria are efficient. The inefficiency of an
equilibrium in general PG’s is caused not only by the manipulative behavior of dominant relays but also
by the myopia of nodes. We illustrate this point by the game depicted in Figure 6. The derivative of link
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Fig. 6. Arbitrarily bad equilibrium of a general PG.
cost functions are marked above each link, e.g. dgw(r) = 2M + 2ε+ δ(r − 2Rs), where M , ε and δ are
positive constants such that M ≫ εRs and M ≫ δRs. The pricing function of each node is marked above
the node. There are three paths from s to w, of which (s, h, i, w) has the smallest marginal cost 4δr even
13Node i need not use honest pricing for h′ 6= h if h′ has positive incoming flow.
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when r = Rs. So the socially optimal routing should allocate Rs entirely to the path (s, h, i, w). However,
the equilibrium shown in Figure 6 leads to only ε/(2δ) being routed on (s, h, i, w) while the rest is routed
on (s, g, w). In fact, s is indifferent among all allocations of Rs to h and g since βh(·) = βg(·) ≡ 2M + ε.
Figure 7 explains why such βh(·) and βg(·) are h and g’s best responses in their competition. Notice that
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Fig. 7. Competition between h and g.
h is able to win only ε/(2δ) of the total flow because it has cost λh(r) = dsh(r) + dh(r) = 2M + 2δr.
This inflated cost is a consequence of i’s myopic pricing. Since i has superior cost (λi(r) = 2δr) relative
to j (λj(r) = 2M + 2δr), i can afford to match j’s pricing function βj(·) ≡ 2M . Neither i nor j has
any incentive to deviate from 2M since i has acquired all the flow ε/(2δ) while making the maximum
possible profit while j would suffer a loss if it tried to win a positive share by bidding lower than 2M .
Although i could have made more profit if it cut its price, thereby making h more competitive, it is unable
to discover this opportunity as it lacks “global vision”.
To conclude, although focal equilibria of a general PG rule out the manipulative pricing by a superior
relay (cf. Sec.III-C), the equilibria are susceptible to the inefficiency caused by the dominant relays’
myopic pricing. Such a source of inefficiency is intrinsic to networks consisting of selfish nodes who are
aware of their neighbors only. The price of anarchy caused by myopic inefficiency can be arbitrarily large.
For the example in Figure 6, the equilibrium holds for all large enough M and results in a total cost
DE =
∫ ε
2δ
0
4δr dr+
∫ Rs− ε2δ
0
2(M+ε−δRs)+2δr dr =
ε2
2δ
+2(M+ε−δRs)
(
Rs −
ε
2δ
)
+δ
(
Rs −
ε
2δ
)2
,
whereas the optimal cost is
D∗ =
∫ Rs
0
4δr dr = 2δR2s.
Therefore, the price of anarchy is at least DE/D∗, which can be made arbitrarily large by increasing M .
Although in a multi-hop network equilibria can be arbitrarily inefficient, we will show in the following
that there is a class of equilibria which are always efficient.
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B. Everywhere Competitive Equilibria
Definition 6: An equilibrium of a general PG is everywhere competitive if it induces a routing (fij)(i,j)∈E
such that fhi > 0 for at least two i ∈ Oh whenever rh > 0 unless w ∈ Oh and fhw > 0.14
Notice that the equilibrium in Figure 6 is not everywhere competitive as i is dominant to j. One would
expect that when no relay is unrivalled, mistakes such as the one made by i could be avoided. The next
theorem validates this intuition. Its proof is contained in the Appendix B.
Theorem 9: If an equilibrium of a general PG is everywhere competitive, it must be efficient.
V. PRICING GAME WITH ELASTIC SOURCE
So far we have assumed that s has a fixed, inelastic demand. In this section, we show that pricing games
with an elastic source can be studied within the same framework we have developed for the inelastic case.
We consider a source s with elastic traffic demand. The source’s preference over different admitted
rates rs is measured by a utility function Us(rs) such that Us(rs) = Us(Rs) for all rs ≥ Rs. In other
words, Rs is the maximum desired service rate of s. In the interval [0, Rs], Us(·) is assumed to be strictly
increasing, concave with continuous derivative us(·). Taking the approach of [19], we define the overflow
rate as fsw , Rs − rs. Thus, at s we have∑
i∈Os
fsi + fsw = Rs. (11)
Let Dsw(fsw) , Us(Rs) − Us(rs) denote the utility loss to s resulting from having a rate of fsw
rejected from the network. Equivalently, if we imagine that the blocked flow fsw is routed on a virtual
overflow link directly from s to w [19], then Dsw(fsw) can simply be interpreted as the cost incurred
on the overflow link when its flow rate is fsw. Moreover, as defined, Dsw(fsw) is strictly increasing,
continuously differentiable, and convex in fsw on [0, Rs]. Denote the derivative of Dsw(·) by dsw(·). Thus,
we can treat the pricing game with an elastic source as one with an inelastic source and an overflow link
(s, w). An oligopoly pricing game with an overflow link is illustrated in Figure 8, where the overflow
link (s, w) is represented by a dashed arrow. Such an oligopoly is essentially the same as those studied
in Section III with the exception that s now has the additional option of sending traffic on link (s, w).
From a pricing perspective, we can think of w as directly competing with relays by using a uniformly-zero
pricing function.
14Recall that we have assumed in Section II-A that either Oh contains at least two relays or Oh = {w}.
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In a general pricing game, the introduction of the overflow link affects only the local competition faced
by i ∈ Os. Now w becomes a new competitor to all i ∈ Os whose presence changes each i’s perception
of the competition. Specifically, the pricing function of i’s virtual competitor is derived as
Bs
iˆ
(r) = min
∑
j∈Ssi
Bhj (fsj) +Dsw(fsw),
where the minimization is taken with respect to nonnegative ((fsj)j∈Ssi , fsw) such that
∑
j fsj + fsw = r.
The conclusions for pricing games with an elastic source are almost verbatim to those for inelastic pricing
games. Limited by space, we do not elaborate further.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work presented a game-theoretic analysis of price competition in multi-hop relay networks. The
introduction of possibly nonlinear pricing functions to the game enabled us to develop a much richer set
of results than if we allowed only constant unit prices. While the socially optimal routing can always be
induced by an equilibrium, the game may have inefficient equilibria as well. Furthermore, the existence
of competition turns out to be a two-sided coin. On the one side, any competitive equilibrium in oligopoly
pricing games and any everywhere competitive equilibrium in general pricing games must be efficient.
On the other side, the conclusion that the price of anarchy of an oligopoly is equal to the number of
competitors seems to suggest that more intense competition only makes inefficient (monopolistic) equilibria
even worse. Unlike the case of oligopolies, the inefficiency of equilibria in a general pricing game can
be attributed not only to manipulative pricing by dominant relays, but also more fundamentally, to the
myopia of dominant relays. We showed that the price of anarchy attributed to both the monopolistic and
myopic effects is unbounded.
23
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 8
We prove the theorem by constructing an equilibrium that supports the socially optimal routing. Let
(f ∗hi) be the link flows of the socially optimal routing. Denote the total incoming flow at node i by
r∗i ,
∑
h∈Pi
f ∗hi. Note that under the socially optimal routing, a path/sub-path has positive flow only if
it has the minimum marginal cost among all paths/sub-paths with the same origin. Let λ∗i denote the
minimum marginal cost of any path/sub-path from i to w (for i = w, λ∗i = 0). Consider the following
pricing scheme. Each relay i adopts βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h for any h ∈ Pi unless r∗h = 0, in which case honest
pricing βhi (t) = dhi(t) + di(r∗i + t) is enforced. Such a pricing scheme will be referred to as marginal
cost pricing. We show that marginal cost pricing supports the socially optimal routing. That is, for any
relay i, given that each h ∈ Pi has total traffic r∗h to allocate15 and every relay j ∈ Shi adopts βhj (t) ≡ λ∗h
(if w ∈ Shi , it always adopts βhw(t) = dhw(t)), (1) βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h for each h ∈ Pi is a best response and (2)
the traffic allocation (f ∗hi)h∈Pi is the most profitable allocation from i’s perspective (cf. Lemma 1).
We will need the following lemmas to prove the theorem.
Lemma 3: Under marginal cost pricing, for each relay i, its virtual competitor’s pricing function Bh
iˆ
(·)
and its minimum outgoing cost function Di(·) are convex.
Lemma 3 is a special case of the next general observation.
Lemma 4: For any K ∈ N, the function
g(x) , minPK
i=1 xi=x
xi∈Gi,i=1,··· ,K
K∑
i=1
gi(xi)
is convex if every gi(·) with domain Gi is convex.
Proof: Let y, z be two distinct points in the domain of g(·). For any λ ∈ [0, 1], let λ¯ denote 1 − λ. We
have
λg(y) + λ¯g(z) = λ minP
i yi=y
yi∈Gi
∑
i
gi(yi) + λ¯ minP
i zi=z
zi∈Gi
∑
i
gi(zi)
(a)
= λ
∑
i
gi(y
∗
i ) + λ¯
∑
i
gi(z
∗
i )
(b)
≥
∑
i
gi(λy
∗
i + λ¯z
∗
i )
15We consider only those h ∈ Pi with r∗h > 0, since any predecessor with zero traffic is irrelevant to the determination of i’s best response,
and so can be ignored.
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(c)
≥ minP
i xi=λy+λ¯z
xi∈Gi
∑
i
gi(xi) = g(λy + λ¯z).
For equality (a), we assume (y∗i ) = argminPi yi=y
∑
i gi(yi) and (z∗i ) = argminPi zi=z
∑
i gi(zi). Inequal-
ity (b) follows from the convexity of each gi(·). Because
∑
i λy
∗
i + λ¯z
∗
i = λy + λ¯z and λy∗i + λ¯z∗i ∈ Gi
for i = 1, · · · , K, we have inequality (c). 
Proof of Lemma 3: By definition,
Bh
iˆ
(t) = minP
j∈Sh
i
fhj=t
∑
j∈Shi
Bhj (fhj),
where Bhj (t) =
∫ t
0
βhj (r) dr. Under marginal cost pricing βhj (r) ≡ λ∗h if j is a relay or βhj (r) = dhj(r) if
j is the destination, in either case Bhj (t) is convex. So Bhiˆ (t) is convex by Lemma 4. Similarly, we have
Di(t) = minP
k∈Oi
fik=t
∑
k∈Oi
Bik(fik),
which is convex also because each Bik(t) is convex. 
Lemma 3 implies that under marginal cost pricing, βh
iˆ
(t) = d
dt
Bh
iˆ
(t) and di(t) = ddtDi(t) are non-
decreasing for all relays i and all h ∈ Pi. In fact, βhiˆ (t) and di(t) have the following characterization.
Lemma 5: Under marginal cost pricing, βh
iˆ
(t) of any relay i and any h ∈ Pi with positive incoming
traffic can be expressed as16
βh
iˆ
(t) =

 λ
∗
h, if w /∈ Shi
min(dhw(t), λ
∗
h), otherwise
, (12)
and if i has positive incoming traffic, then di(t) can be expressed as
di(t) =


λ∗i , if w /∈ Oi
diw(t), if Oi = {w}
min(diw(t), λ
∗
i ), otherwise
. (13)
Proof: First, by assumption, Shi contains at least one relay and every relay j in Shi applies βhj (t) ≡ λ∗h.
If w /∈ Shi , the (marginal) pricing function of i’s virtual competitor is nothing but βhiˆ (t) ≡ λ∗h. However,
if w ∈ Shi , it always adopts βhw(t) = dhw(t). Thus, the pricing function of i’s virtual competitor is
Bh
iˆ
(t) = min
x+y=t
∫ x
0
dhw(r) dr +
∫ y
0
λ∗h dr.
16Recall the assumption that either Oh contains at least two relays or Oh = {w}.
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Because dhw(r) is increasing, βhiˆ (t) =
d
dt
Bh
iˆ
(t) = min(dhw(t), λ
∗
h). The derivation of (13) is almost
verbatim, and we we skip it for brevity. 
While Lemma 5 provides general expressions for βh
iˆ
(t) and di(t) under marginal cost pricing, the
following lemma specifies the values of the two functions evaluated at the optimal routing configuration,
i.e., βh
iˆ
(r∗h−f
∗
hi) and di(r∗i ). These values are crucial to determining a best response βhi (·) for all h ∈ Pi.
Lemma 6: Under marginal cost pricing and at the socially optimal routing (f ∗mn)(m,n)∈E with r∗n =∑
m∈Pn
f ∗mn, n ∈ N , we have for any relay i and any h ∈ Pi, βhiˆ (r
∗
h − f
∗
hi) = λ
∗
h and di(r∗i ) = λ∗i .
Furthermore, βh
iˆ
(t) ≡ λ∗h for t ∈ [r∗h − f ∗hi, r∗h].
Proof: By (12), βh
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi) can be evaluated as follows:
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi) =

 λ
∗
h, if w /∈ Shi
min(dhw(r
∗
h − f
∗
hi), λ
∗
h) = λ
∗
h, otherwise
,
where the second equality holds since dhw(r∗h−f ∗hi) ≥ dhw(f ∗hw) ≥ λ∗h. So in summary, βhiˆ (r
∗
h−f
∗
hi) = λ
∗
h
under all circumstances. Moreover, (12) also implies that βh
iˆ
(t) ≤ λ∗h for all t ∈ [0, r∗h]. However, βhiˆ (t)
is nondecreasing as a result of Lemma 3. Thus, βh
iˆ
(t) ≡ λ∗h for t ∈ [r∗h − f ∗hi, r∗h].
Next we show that under marginal cost pricing, di(r∗i ) = λ∗i for all nodes i. Let’s first assume r∗i > 0
and use the expression (13). If Oi = {w}, di(t) = βiw(t) = diw(t). In this case, f ∗iw = r∗i and so di(r∗i ) =
diw(f
∗
iw) = λ
∗
i . If w /∈ Oi, then all the offsprings of i announce βij(·) ≡ λ∗i , thus di(·) ≡ λ∗i . Finally, if
both w and some relay j are in Oi, then di(t) = min(diw(t), λ∗i ). Because diw(r∗i ) ≥ diw(f ∗iw) ≥ λ∗i , we
have di(r∗i ) = min(diw(r∗i ), λ∗i ) = λ∗i . So we are done with the case r∗i > 0.
If r∗i = 0, every offspring j of i adopts honest pricing βij(t) = dij(t) + dj(r∗j + t) (and βiw(t) = diw(t)
if w ∈ Oi). Thus, by defining dw(·) ≡ 0, we can express di(r∗i ) as
di(r
∗
i ) = di(0) = min
j∈Oi
βij(0) = min
j∈Oi
dij(0) + dj(r
∗
j ).
If dj(r∗j ) = λ∗j for all j ∈ Oi, di(r∗i ) must be equal to λ∗i . So far we have shown that dj(r∗j ) = λ∗j if r∗j > 0.
Should r∗j = 0 for some j ∈ Oi, we can evaluate dj(r∗j ) by dj(r∗j ) = dj(0) = mink∈Oj djk(0) + dk(r∗k). If
r∗k > 0 for all k ∈ Oj , then we will be able to show that dj(r∗j ) = λ∗j . Otherwise, we further expand those
dk(r
∗
k) such that r∗k = 0. Because the routing topology is loop-free, eventually the recursive evaluation
will terminate (either when all offsprings have positive incoming traffic or when the destination is the
only offspring17). Then calculating in the reverse order of the recursive expansion, we can in the end show
17If w is the only offspring of a relay, say i, then r∗i = f∗iw and di(r∗i ) = diw(f∗iw) = λ∗i .
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that di(r∗i ) = λ∗i even if r∗i = 0. So the proof is complete. 
Now we are ready to apply Lemma 1 to show that (1) using βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h for all h ∈ Pi is a best response
of i given each h ∈ Pi has total traffic r∗h and its competitors all adopt marginal cost pricing and (2) this
best response induces traffic allocation (f ∗hi)h∈Pi .
Proof of Theorem 8:
Step 1: Referring to Lemma 1, we first show that (f ∗hi)h∈Pi maximizes
Γ¯i(f i;Li) =
∑
h∈Pi
[
Bh
iˆ
(r∗h)− B
h
iˆ
(r∗h − fhi)−Dhi(fhi)
]
−Di
(∑
h∈Pi
fhi
)
=
∑
h∈Pi
∫ fhi
0
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − t)− dhi(t) dt−
∫ P
h∈Pi
fhi
0
di(t) dt
over all the f i = (fhi) such that 0 ≤ fhi ≤ r∗h for all h ∈ Pi.
Note that if f ∗hi > 0, i must be on a sub-path from h to w with the minimum marginal cost, so
λ∗h = dhi(f
∗
hi) + λ
∗
i . Otherwise, λ∗h ≤ dhi(f ∗hi) + λ∗i . Therefore, we can conclude that
(f ∗hi)h∈Pi = argmax
0≤fhi≤r
∗
h
h∈Pi
{∑
h∈Pi
∫ fhi
0
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − t)− dhi(t)− di(r
∗
i − f
∗
hi + t) dt
}
= argmax
0≤fhi≤r
∗
h
h∈Pi
{
Γ¯i(f i;Li) +
∫ P
h∈Pi
fhi
0
di(t) dt−
∑
h∈Pi
∫ fhi
0
di(r
∗
i − f
∗
hi + t) dt
}
, argmax
0≤fhi≤r
∗
h
h∈Pi
{
Γ¯i(f i;Li) + ∆(f i)
}
.
The first equality follows from the fact that βh
iˆ
(r∗h − t) − dhi(t) − di(r
∗
i − f
∗
hi + t) is nonincreasing in t
(by Lemma 3) and that
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi)− dhi(f
∗
hi)− di(r
∗
i )

 ≤ 0, f
∗
hi = 0
= 0, 0 < f ∗hi ≤ r
∗
m
, (14)
which follows from Lemma 6. The second and third equalities are by regrouping terms and defining the
terms other than Γ¯i(f i;Li) to be ∆(f i). We can rewrite ∆(f i) as
∆(f i) =
∫ ri
0
di(t) dt−
∑
h∈Pi
∫ r∗i−f∗hi+fhi
r∗i−f
∗
hi
di(t) dt.
Now consider the difference
∆(f i)−∆(f
∗
i ) =
∫ ri
r∗i
di(t) dt−
∑
h∈Pi
∫ r∗i−f∗hi+fhi
r∗i
di(t) dt.
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Recall that di(·) is positive and nondecreasing. If fhi ≥ f ∗hi for all h ∈ Pi, then the difference is easily
seen to be nonnegative. If fhi ≤ f ∗hi for all h ∈ Pi, we can rewrite the difference as
∆(f i)−∆(f
∗
i ) =
∑
h∈Pi
∫ r∗i
r∗i−f
∗
hi
+fhi
di(t) dt−
∫ r∗i
ri
di(t) dt,
which, by the same reason, is nonnegative.
To summarize, the function ∆(f i) is minimized at f∗i within the region F(f∗i ) , {f i : fhi ≥ f ∗hi, ∀h ∈
Pi or fhi ≤ f ∗hi, ∀h ∈ Pi}. Thus, it can be concluded that Γ¯i(f i;Li) must be maximized at f ∗i within
F(f∗i ). Recall that the feasible region for the maximization of Γ¯i(f i;Li) is Fi = {f i : 0 ≤ fhi ≤ r∗h, ∀h ∈
Pi}. Next we show that the maximizer of Γ¯i(f i;Li) cannot lie in F c(f∗i ) , Fi\F(f∗i ).
Suppose Γ¯i(f i;Li) is maximized at f¯ i. Then at the maximum it must hold for all h ∈ Pi that
∂
∂fhi
Γ¯i(f¯ i;Li) = β
h
iˆ
(r∗h − f¯hi)− dhi(f¯hi)− di(r¯i)


≤ 0, f¯hi = 0
= 0, 0 < f¯hi < r
∗
h
≥ 0, f¯hi = r∗h
,
or equivalently
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − f¯hi)− dhi(f¯hi)


≤ di(r¯i), f¯hi = 0
= di(r¯i), 0 < f¯hi < r
∗
h
≥ di(r¯i), f¯hi = r∗h
, (15)
where r¯i =
∑
h f¯hi. It is straightforward to verify that f
∗
i is a solution to the above simultaneous formulas
(cf (14)). Next we demonstrate that there is no other solution in F c(f∗i ). First, if f ∗hi = 0 for all h ∈ Pi or
if f ∗hi = r∗h for all h ∈ Pi, then F c(f
∗
i ) is empty, so we are done. Otherwise, let P0i , {h ∈ Pi : f ∗hi = 0},
P+i , {h ∈ Pi : f
∗
hi = r
∗
h}. Hence, for those h ∈ Pi\(P0i ∪P+i ), f ∗hi is in the interior of [0, r∗h]. Accordingly,
the simultaneous formulas satisfied by f ∗i are
βh
iˆ
(r∗h)− dhi(0) ≤ di(r
∗
i ), h ∈ P
0
i ,
βh
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi)− dhi(f
∗
hi) ≥ di(r
∗
i ), h ∈ P
+
i ,
βh
iˆ
(0)− dhi(r
∗
h) = di(r
∗
i ), otherwise.
Now suppose there is a different solution f ′i in F c(f ∗i ) such that for some a, b ∈ Pi, f ′ai > f ∗ai and
f ′bi < f
∗
bi. It follows that a /∈ P+i and b /∈ P0i . Hence, βaiˆ (r
∗
a−f
∗
ai)−dai(f
∗
ai) ≤ β
b
iˆ
(r∗b−f
∗
bi)−dbi(f
∗
bi). Because
βh
iˆ
(r∗h−fhi)−dhi(fhi) is strictly decreasing with fhi for all h ∈ Pi, we must have βaiˆ (r
∗
a−f
′
ai)−dai(f
′
ai) <
βb
iˆ
(r∗b − f
′
bi)− dbi(f
′
bi). However, since f ′ai > 0, f ′bi < r∗b , and they satisfy the respective formulas in (15),
it follows that
βa
iˆ
(r∗a − f
′
ai)− dai(f
′
ai) ≥ di(r
′
i) ≥ β
b
iˆ
(r∗b − f
′
bi)− dbi(f
′
bi),
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thus, a contradiction. Therefore, we have shown that no solution exists in F c(f∗i ).
To recap, the maximizer of Γ¯i(f i;Li) must fall in F(f∗i ). Moreover, we have found that f ∗i maximizes
Γ¯i(f i;Li) within F(f∗i ). So we can conclude that
f∗i = argmax
Fi
Γ¯i(f i;Li).
Step 2: Next we show that condition (4) holds with βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h, i.e,
Bhi (t) ≥ B
h
iˆ
(r∗h)−B
h
iˆ
(r∗h − t)
for all h ∈ Pi and all t ∈ [0, r∗h]. Since βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h, LHS is Bhi (t) =
∫ t
0
βhi (r) dr = λ
∗
ht. By the
expression (12), βh
iˆ
(t) ≤ λ∗h under all circumstances. So the RHS of the above inequality is Bhiˆ (r
∗
h) −
Bh
iˆ
(r∗h − t) =
∫ r∗
h
r∗
h
−t
βh
iˆ
(r) dr ≤ λ∗ht. And this proves (4).
Step 3: Finally, we prove that condition (5) is established by the combination of the pricing function
βhi (t) ≡ λ
∗
h and the traffic allocation f ∗hi, i.e., for all h ∈ Pi,
Bhi (f
∗
hi) = B
h
iˆ
(r∗h)− B
h
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi).
Note that the LHS is equal to Bhi (f ∗hi) =
∫ f∗
hi
0
βhi (r) dr = λ
∗
hf
∗
hi. By Lemma 6, βhiˆ (t) ≡ λ
∗
h for t ∈
[r∗h − f
∗
hi, r
∗
h]. It follows that Bhiˆ (r
∗
h)− B
h
iˆ
(r∗h − f
∗
hi) =
∫ r∗
h
r∗
h
−f∗
hi
βh
iˆ
(r) dr = λ∗hf
∗
hi. So (5) is proved.
Conclusion: With all the necessary and sufficient conditions in Lemma 1 satisfied, we can conclude
that βhi (t) ≡ λ∗h for all h ∈ Pi is a best response of i given that all its competitors also adopt marginal cost
pricing. Furthermore, the socially optimal routing (f ∗hi) is the traffic allocation induced by the equilibrium
under marginal cost pricing. Therefore, the proof for Theorem 8 is complete. 
B. Proof of Theorem 9
We use the following lemmas to prove the theorem.
Lemma 7: Given any (focal) equilibrium with induced link flows (fhi) and node total incoming rates
(ri), for any node i with ri ∈ (0, Rs), its actual marginal cost λhi (·) of forwarding traffic for any h ∈ Pi
(with fh′i of all other h′ ∈ Pi fixed) satisfies
λhi (fhi)
+ ≤ λhi (fhi)
−, (16)
where λhi (fhi)+ and λhi (fhi)− are the right and left limits of λhi (·) at fhi.
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Proof: First assume that i has only one offspring, which by our assumption must be the destination.
Thus, λhi (t) = dhi(t)+ diw(t). Since both dhi(·) and diw(·) are continuous everywhere, λhi (·) must also be
continuous everywhere. The inequality (16) holds with equality.
Next assume that i has multiple offsprings. By the same reasoning as used in the proof of Lemma 2,
for any j ∈ Oi with fij > 0, we have
λhi (fhi)
+ ≤ dhi(fhi) + β
i
jˆ
(ri − fij)
+ = dhi(fhi) + β
i
j(fij)
− ≤ λhi (fhi)
−,
where the equality follows from the replicating response βij(t) = βijˆ(ri − t), t ∈ [0, fij], assumed by a
focal equilibrium. 
Lemma 8: Given any (focal) equilibrium with induced link flows (fhi) and node total incoming rates
(ri), for any h 6= w such that fhi > 0 and fhj > 0 for two different relays i, j ∈ Oh, it holds that
(i) the actual marginal cost λhi (·), λhj (·) of i and j forwarding traffic for h are continuous at fhi and
fhj , respectively;
(ii) the marginal pricing functions βh
iˆ
(·), βh
jˆ
(·) of i and j’s virtual competitors are continuous at rh−fhi
and rh − fhj , respectively;
(iii)
λhi (fhi) = λ
h
j (fhj) = β
h
iˆ
(rh − fhi) = β
h
jˆ
(rh − fhj) , ηh.
Proof: The replicating response implies βhi (fhi)− = βhiˆ (rh − fhi)+. The fact that
fhi = argmax
0≤f≤rh
∫ f
0
βh
iˆ
(rh − r)− λ
h
i (r) dr
implies βh
iˆ
(rh − fhi)+ ≥ λi(fhi)− and λi(fhi)+ ≥ βhiˆ (rh − fhi)
−
. By the same reasoning as used in the
proof of Lemma 2, it can be shown that βh
iˆ
(rh − fhi)− ≥ βhj (fhj)
−
. Invoking Lemma 7, we have
βhi (fhi)
− = βh
iˆ
(rh − fhi)
+ ≥ λhi (fhi)
− ≥ λhi (fhi)
+ ≥ βh
iˆ
(rh − fhi)
− ≥ βhj (fhj)
−. (17)
By symmetry,
βhj (fhj)
− = βh
jˆ
(rh − fhj)
+ ≥ λhj (fhj)
− ≥ λhj (fhj)
+ ≥ βh
jˆ
(rh − fhj)
− ≥ βhi (fhi)
−.
Thus, it can be concluded that all terms involved in the above two inequalities must be equal to each
other. So the proof is complete. 
Lemma 9: Given any (focal) equilibrium with induced link flows (fhi) and node total incoming rates
(ri), for any h 6= w such that fhw > 0 and fhi > 0 for a relay i ∈ Oh, it holds that
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(i) the actual marginal cost λhw(·), λhi (·) of w and i forwarding traffic for h are continuous at fhw and
fhi, respectively;
(ii) the marginal pricing functions βh
iˆ
(·) of i’s virtual competitor is continuous at rh − fhi;
(iii)
λhi (fhi) = β
h
iˆ
(rh − fhi).
Proof: First of all, w always uses honest pricing, i.e., βhw(·) = λhw(·) = dhw(·). So λhw(·) and βhw(·)
are continuous everywhere. For the relay i, the inequality (17) holds with j being replaced by w.
Also notice that βhi (fhi)− ≤ βhw(fhw)+. For otherwise, h would be able to strictly reduce its total cost
by shifting an infinitesimal amount of flow from (h, i) to (h, w). However, since βhw(·) is continuous,
βhw(fhw)
+ = βhw(fhw)
−
. It follows that all the inequalities in (17) must hold with equality. So the proof is
complete. 
Lemma 10: At an everywhere competitive equilibrium, all the paths with positive flow have equal
marginal cost.
Proof: Let s, n1, n2, · · · , nk, w be the nodes on a path R with positive flow at the equilibrium. For
simplicity, denote s by n0 and w by nk+1. So fnini+1 > 0 for all i = 0, 1, · · · , k.
At the equilibrium we must have for all i = 1, · · · , k − 1,
λni−1ni (fni−1ni)
−
(a)
≥ dni−1ni(fni−1ni) + β
ni
ni+1
(fnini+1)
− (b)= dni−1ni(fni−1ni) + β
ni
nˆi+1
(rni − fnini+1)
+
(c)
≥ dni−1ni(fni−1ni) + λ
ni
ni+1
(fnini+1)
−.
We have seen inequality (a) in the proof of Lemma 7. The equality (b) follows from the replicating
response. The inequality (c) is due to the fact that fnini+1 is the ideal flow rate to ni+1 given β
ni
nˆi+1
(·).
Using the above relation successively from i = 1 to i = k − 1, we obtain
λsn1(fsn1)
− ≥ dsn1(fsn1) + dn1n2(fn1n2) + · · ·+ dnk−2nk−1(nk−2nk−1) + λ
nk−1
nk
(fnk−1nk)
−.
Finally notice that βnkw (·) = dnkw(·), so
λnk−1nk (fnk−1nk)
− ≥ dnk−1nk + β
nk
w (fnkw)
− = dnk−1nk + dnkw(fnkw).
Therefore, the marginal cost of path R is upper bounded as
dsn1(fsn1) + dn1n2(fn1n2) + · · ·+ dnk−1nk(fnk−1nk) + dnkw(fnkw) ≤ λ
s
n1
(fsn1)
−
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Furthermore, since the equilibrium is everywhere competitive, there exists a node n′i 6= ni for every
i = 1, · · · , k such that fni−1n′i > 0. Using the results of Lemma 8 and 9, we can show that
dni−1ni(fni−1ni) + λ
ni
ni+1
(fnini+1) = dni−1ni(fni−1ni) + β
ni
nˆi+1
(rni − fnini+1) ≥ λ
ni−1
ni
(fni−1ni),
for i = 1, · · · , k − 1. Applying the above inequality successively from i = k − 1 to i = 1, we have
dsn1(fsn1) + dn1n2(fn1n2) + · · ·+ dnk−1nk(fnk−1nk) + dnkw(fnkw)
= dsn1(fsn1) + dn1n2(fn1n2) + · · ·+ dnk−1nk(fnk−1nk) + β
nk
w (fnkw)
≥ dsn1(fsn1) + dn1n2(fn1n2) + · · ·+ λ
nk−1
nk
.
.
.
≥ λsn1(fsn1).
Also by Lemma 8, λsn1(·) is continuous at fsn1 . Thus, the lower and upper bounds of the total marginal
cost of R are both equal to λsn1(fsn1) = ηs. Since R is chosen arbitrarily, we can conclude that all the
paths with positive flow have the same marginal cost ηs. 
Proof of Theorem 9: By Lemma 10, at an everywhere competitive equilibrium, every path with positive
flow has the same marginal cost ηs. To prove that the routing is socially optimal, it remains to show that
any path with zero flow has marginal cost greater than or equal to ηs. Let s, z1, · · · , zm, w be the nodes
on a zero-flow path Z . To simplify notation, write s as z0 and w as zm+1. Recall that the flow rate of
a path is the minimum of the flow rates on all its links. So there exist link(s) (zi, zi+1) on Z such that
fzizi+1 = 0. Next we show that on path Z ,
dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + λ
zi
zi+1
(fzizi+1)
+ ≥ λzi−1zi (fzi−1zi)
+, (18)
where i = 1, · · · , m.
Notice that for i = m,
dzm−1zm(fzm−1zm) + λ
zm
zm+1(fzmzm+1)
+ = dzm−1zm(fzm−1zm) + dzmw(fzmw) ≥ λ
zm−1
zm (fzm−1zm)
+.
Now consider any i = 1, · · · , m− 1. At an everywhere competitive equilibrium, if fzizi+1 > 0, then there
must exist z′i+1 6= zi+1 for which fziz′i+1 > 0. Applying Lemma 8 or 9, we have
dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + λ
zi
zi+1
(fzizi+1) = dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + β
zi
zˆi+1
(rzi − fzizi+1) ≥ λ
zi−1
zi
(fzi−1zi)
+.
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This is a special case of (18) as λzizi+1(·) is continuous at fzizi+1 . If fzizi+1 = 0, however, we have to
consider the following two cases. In the first case, rzi > 0, so zi has at least two offsprings z′i+1, z′′i+1
such that fziz′i+1 > 0 and fziz′′i+1 > 0. Assume z
′
i+1 6= w, we therefore have
dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + λ
zi
zi+1
(fzizi+1)
+ = dzi−1zi(0) + λ
zi
zi+1
(0)+
(a)
≥ dzi−1zi(0) + β
zi
zˆi+1
(rzi)
−
(b)
≥ dzi−1zi(0) + β
zi
z′i+1
(fziz′i+1)
−
(c)
= dzi−1zi(0) + β
zi
zˆ′i+1
(rzi − fziz′i+1) ≥ λ
zi−1
zi
(fzi−1zi)
+.
Here, inequality (a) holds because fzizi+1 = 0 is the ideal amount of flow to zi+1. We applied the same
reasoning as used in the proof of Lemma 2 to get (b). Inequality (c) follows from the replicating response
of z′i+1 and from using Lemma 8 or 9 (depending on whether z′i+1 = w or not). Next we consider the
case where rzi = 0 and consequently all offsprings of zi adopt honest pricing to zi. It follows that
dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + λ
zi
zi+1
(fzizi+1)
+ = dzi−1zi(fzi−1zi) + β
zi
zi+1
(fzizi+1)
+ ≥ λzi−1zi (fzi−1zi)
+.
So far we have proved (18). Using (18) we can lower bound the marginal cost of Z as
dz0z1(fz0z1) + · · ·+ dzm−1zm(fzm−1zm) + dzmw(fzmw)
= dz0z1(fz0z1) + · · ·+ dzm−1zm(fzm−1zm) + λ
zm
w (fzmw)
.
.
.
≥ λsz1(fsz1)
+.
If fsz1 > 0, by Lemma 8, λsz1(·) is continuous at fsz1 and is equal to ηs. So we are done. If fsz1 = 0, s
must have two other offsprings z′1, z′′1 for which fsz′1 > 0, fsz′′1 > 0. Then we can apply the same argument
as we used in inequalities (a)-(c) to show that
λsz1(fsz1)
+ ≥ βszˆ′
1
(Rs − fsz′
1
) = λsz′
1
(fsz′
1
),
where λsz′
1
(fsz′
1
) = ηs. So we are done.
To summarize, we have shown that at an everywhere competitive equilibrium, every path with positive
flow has the same marginal cost ηs; moreover, every path with zero flow has marginal cost greater than
or equal to ηs. Therefore, the routing pattern of such an equilibrium is socially optimal. 
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